

Vanderbilt University Interlibrary Loan

**Borrower: TXM**

**(TXM-TN: 137302)**

**Lending String:** \*TJC,TEJ,TPA,FXN,MUM

**Trans.Date:** 4/24/2007 09:04:51 AM

**Patron:** Clark, Victor

**Journal Title:** The Ancient world.

**Volume:** 23 **Issue:**

**Month/Year:** 1992

**Pages:** 87-94

**Article:** Ehrhardt, Christopher; Monumental Evidence for the Date of Constantine's First War against Licinius

**Imprint:** [Chicago, Ares Publishers]

**ILL Number:** 30159059



**Call #:** DE1 .A375

**Location:** CENTRAL 6TH-FLOOR

**ODYSSEY:** 161.45.205.112

Ariel

**Maxcost:** Free

**Billing Category:** Exempt  
**Charge:**

**Shipping Address:**

**Middle Tenn. St. Univ. Lib**

**ILL**

**Box 13/1500 Greenland Drive**

**Murfreesboro, TN 37132**

**\*\*VIA ATHENA COURIER\*\***

**Fax:** (615) 898-5551

**Odyssey**

**ARIEL:** 161.45.205.82 OK

**Notes**

Ariel  
SAB  
4/27  
TXM --- ATHENA

TJC-TN: 275588



**Needed: 4/27**

# Monumental Evidence for the Date of Constantine's First War against Licinius<sup>1</sup>

## I. *The State of the Question*

Nearly forty years ago, P. Bruun argued that the first war between Constantine and Licinius, the so-called *Bellum Cibalense*, took place not in 314, as was generally supposed, on the basis of the *consularia Constantinopolitana*, but in 316-317.<sup>2</sup> Chr. Habicht then analysed the literary evidence, and Bruun presented the numismatic material more fully; finally T. D. Barnes discussed the whole problem in a clear and thorough article;<sup>3</sup> as a result, the *new* dating, of 316-317, seemed to be generally accepted.<sup>4</sup> However, there have been notable exceptions: for example, M. R. Alföldi, in an important discussion of an imperial jewel, used its inscription as an argument for the *traditional* dating of 314,<sup>5</sup> while R. Andreotti, in two detailed discussions of the chronology of the period, reached the rather curious conclusion that the 'first war' was in fact two wars, one fought late in 314, the second late in 316.<sup>6</sup>

In the last five years, four studies have appeared, all dealing with the problem in some detail: I. König, in his exhaustive commentary on the *Origo Constantini Imperatoris* (part one of the *Excerpta Valesiana*), restates the case for 314, as does D. Kienast in his contribution to the *Festschrift* for Ilona Opelt; Th. Grünewald, in his excellent study of Constantinian propaganda, makes a strong case for the *new* chronology, of 316-317; while the joint article of M. Di Maio, J. Zeuga and J. Bethune gives arguments for supporting Andreotti's theory of a double war.<sup>7</sup> In view of these contradictory results, of which at most only one can be right, it seems justified to look for further evidence which has so far not been used in the debate. First, how-

<sup>1</sup>My sincere thanks to the University of Otago, for the study leave which made it possible for me to write this article; to the *Institut für Alte Geschichte der Universität des Saarlandes*, and particularly to Professor P. R. Franke, for their generous hospitality and excellent facilities; and to the *Kommission für Alte Geschichte und Epigraphik*, and its Director, Dr. M. Wörle, in Munich, where this article was begun under practically ideal conditions. Its faults are all my own.

<sup>2</sup>P. Bruun, *The Constantinian Coinage of Arelate* (Helsinki, 1953) 17-21; *Chronica Minora*, MGH, AA ed. Th. Mommsen (Berlin, 1892, reprint, 1951), 9, 1, 231.

<sup>3</sup>Chr. Habicht, "Zur Geschichte des Kaisers Konstantin," *Hermes* 86 (1958) 360-378; Bruun, *Studies in Constantinian Chronology* (New York, 1961) 10-22; T. D. Barnes, "Lactantius and Constantine," *JRS* 63 (1973) 29-46, esp. 36-38.

<sup>4</sup>Averil Cameron, "Constantinus Christianus," *JRS* 73 (1983) 185.

<sup>5</sup>M. R. Alföldi, "Die Niederremmeler Kaiserfibel: zum Datum des ersten Krieges zwischen Konstantin und Licinius," *BJ* 176 (1976) 183-200.

<sup>6</sup>R. Andreotti, "Licinius (Valerius Licinianus)," *Dizionario Epigrafico* IV, 1 (Rome 1959), 1001-1014; *id.*, "Recenti contributi alla cronologia costantiniana," *Latomus* 23 (1964) 543-552.

<sup>7</sup>I. König, *Origo Constantini: Anonymous Valesianus Teil I, Text und Kommentar* (Trier, 1987) 119-123; D. Kienast, "Das Bellum Cibalense und die Morde des Licinius," *Roma Renascens* (ed. M. Wissemann, Frankfurt a. M., 1988) 149-171; Th. Grünewald, *Constantinus Maximus Augustus: Herrschaftspropaganda in der zeitgenössischen Überlieferung* (Stuttgart, 1990), 109-112; M. di Maio, J. Zeuga, J. Bethune, "Proelium Cibalense et Proelium Campi Ardiensis: The first civil war of Constantine I and Licinius I," *AncW* 21 (1990) 67-91.

ever, some remarks on the oddity of this civil war.

## II. *The Unusual Character of the Bellum Cibalense*

From the first Roman civil war—that begun by Sulla's march on Rome in 88 B.C.—onward, every Roman civil war had, in principle at least, been fought to the finish: the Senate declared Sulla's opponents in 88 B.C. to be outlaws, as public enemies;<sup>8</sup> Marius and Cinna in the following year, after killing many of their opponents, including the consul Cn. Octavius, prepared to have two of their leading foes, L. Merula, made suffect consul by Octavius in Cinna's place, and Marius' rival Q. Lutatius Catulus, face charges in show trials, but these two avoided this disgrace by suicide.<sup>9</sup> Notoriously Sulla, after his victorious return, declared that all those who had fought as officers for the established government after the breakdown in negotiations between the consul L. Scipio Asiaticus and himself in 83 B.C., were public enemies and therefore outlaws.<sup>10</sup> In the civil war between Caesar and Pompey, there were indeed proposals made by Caesar, the rebel, for negotiations and a compromise peace,<sup>11</sup> but these were consistently rejected by the representatives of the legitimate government, or those who held themselves to be so,<sup>12</sup> so that Caesar finally could win the wars only through the deaths of the opposing leaders. In the confused politics and warfare of the eighteen months after Caesar's assassination, the decision about who was fighting for the Republic and who were its enemies depended chiefly on the momentary distribution of military power;<sup>13</sup> once that was finally clear, by the alliance of Mark Antony, Lepidus, and the young Caesar (Octavian), their opponents were necessarily public enemies, and the new round of proscriptions the logical consequence.<sup>14</sup>

So too the wars against Sextus Pompey and against Brutus and Cassius could end, from the triumvirs' point of view, only in total victory.<sup>15</sup> Finally, the war in which young Caesar was victorious at Actium was of course not a civil war—the civil wars had officially been declared

<sup>8</sup>Sources in A. H. J. Greenidge and A.H. Clay, *Sources for Roman History, 133-70 B.C.*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1961) 164f.

<sup>9</sup>Appian, *BC* I.71; cf. Cicero, *de oratore* III 3.9, on Catulus.

<sup>10</sup>Appian, *BC* I.95; F. Hinard, *Les proscriptions de la Rome républicaine* (Paris, 1985) esp. 30-37.

<sup>11</sup>Caesar, *BC* I.9-10 (cf. Cicero, *ad Atticum* VII.13a [= 137 Shackleton Bailey], 2); 24, 5 (cf. Cic., *ad Att.* IX.7C [= SB 174C], 2, a letter from Caesar to Oppius and Balbus; IX.13a (SB 181), and 13A (= SB 181A), the letter from Balbus to Cicero; 26.2-5; 32.8-33.2; III.10.3-11.1 and 18.3-5; 57.

<sup>12</sup>See, for example, the behaviour of Considius in Africa, *BAfr.* 4.

<sup>13</sup>Even here, however, decisions of principle still were made, as by M. Iuventius Laterensis, who killed himself after failing to persuade Lepidus not to join the *public enemy*, Mark Antony, Cic., *ad Familiares* X.23 (= SB 414), 4.

<sup>14</sup>App. *BC* IV, 5-7; the official preamble to the proscription list, ib. 8-11. In general, Hinard, *op. cit.*, (n. 9), 227-257. Full references in T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, 2 vols. (New York, 1952) II, 337-8.

<sup>15</sup>Detailed references to the sources in Broughton, 360-1 (Brutus and Cassius in 42 B.C.); 399-400, 402, and 408-9 (Sextus Pompey in 36 and 35 B.C.)

## MONUMENTAL EVIDENCE

at an end in 36 B.C.<sup>16</sup>-but a foreign war against the Queen of Egypt and the renegade Romans who supported her,<sup>17</sup> which could only end with total Roman victory.

Once Augustus had established a monarchy, decorated rather than disguised with republican trappings,<sup>18</sup> there were applied to him the famous lines of Homer (*Iliad* 2.204-206), *Let there be one ruler, one king, to whom Zeus has given the sceptre*<sup>19</sup> and the position of the monarch on earth was equated with that of the sun in the heaven.<sup>20</sup> Rebellion, therefore, which set up a rival emperor, was not only sacrilege, by opposing the choice of Zeus, but also an offence against the natural order. The sensitivity of emperors in this regard is well shown by the fierce reaction of the authorities against the Christian Procopius, who quoted the Homeric lines against the Diocletianic tetrarchy, which flagrantly infringed this *law of Nature*, and who therefore was immediately beheaded.<sup>21</sup>

There is therefore no case in which a rebellion and civil war against a ruling emperor ended in a formal compromise which allowed both claimants to retain power, until Maximian Herculus' assumption of the title *Augustus* was accepted by Diocletian and the foundation for the Tetrarchy was laid.<sup>22</sup> On occasion it proved impossible, for a considerable period, for either side to overthrow the other and there was *de facto* coexistence, as for example between the central power and the *Gallic Empire* from 250 to 274 on the one side<sup>23</sup>-despite the determined efforts of both Gallienus and Claudius Gothicus to overthrow their rivals-and the empire of Palmyra under Zenobia and Vaballathus on the other;<sup>24</sup> and later the schismatic British em-

<sup>16</sup>App. BC V.130. A truer appreciation was possible twenty three years later, in 8 B.C., in the decree changing the name of the month *Sextilis* to *August*, because, among other reasons, "Egypt was brought under the control of the Roman People in this month, and in this month an end was placed on the civil wars" (Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 1.12.35; cf. Censorinus, *de die natali* 22.16). It has been held that Censorinus' date of 8 B.C. is wrong and that the decree was in fact passed in 27 B.C., soon after the young Caesar received the name *Augustus* (references in J. Gage, *Res Gestae Divi Augusti* [Paris, 1950], 158 n. 1), but it seems unlikely that official propaganda would have been contradicted so publicly so soon.

<sup>17</sup>References in Broughton, 418.

<sup>18</sup>The notion that Augustus established a *constitutional* monarchy is absurd-as Syme said, "The Roman constitution was a screen and a sham," *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford, 1939, reprint 1971) 15. Gaius Caligula at his accession was granted only the powers which Augustus had held (Dio Cassius LIX.3.1-2), but he could truly say to his grandmother Antonia, Mark Antony's daughter, "Remember I am allowed to do everything to everybody" (Suetonius, *Gaius* 29.1).

<sup>19</sup>Quoted, or rather adapted, by the philosopher Areius to justify young Caesar's killing of his half-brother by adoption, 'Caesarion' (Ptolemy XV), Cleopatra's son by Julius Caesar, in 30 B.C. (Plutarch, *Antony* 81.2-82.1); also quoted (not surprisingly) by Gaius Caligula (Suet., *Gaius* 22.1), who not infrequently imitated, or parodied, his great-grandfather (e.g. in marriage customs, Suet., *Gaius* 25.1).

<sup>20</sup>A. A. T. Ehrhardt, *Politische Metaphysik von Solon bis Augustin* (Tübingen, 1959) II, 21 and n. 5, 285 n. 6; and I, 299 and n. 2 for the relevance to Augustus.

<sup>21</sup>Eusebius, *Martyrs of Palestine* 1.1.

<sup>22</sup>For the obscure, and deliberately obscured, circumstances of Maximian's elevation from *Caesar* to *Augustus*, see O. Seeck, *Geschichte des Untergangs der antiken Welt*, 4th ed. (Stuttgart, 1921), 26, and the detailed arguments in the notes, 446-450, which seem to provide a more probable account than F. Kolb's reconstruction, *Diocletian und die Erste Tetrarchie* (Berlin, 1987) 22-67.

<sup>23</sup>J. Drinkwater, *The Gallic Empire: Separatism and Continuity in the Northwestern Provinces of the Roman Empire, A.D. 260-274* (Stuttgart, 1987).

<sup>24</sup>*Der Kleine Pauly* 5 (Munich, 1975), col. 1085, *Vaballathus*, by A. Lippold; coll. 1491-2, *Zenobia* (2), by R. Engel.

pire of Carausius and Allectus.<sup>25</sup> Occasionally in such circumstances the weaker party might officially recognise the stronger,<sup>26</sup> but this recognition was never reciprocated. A partial exception could be seen in the case of Maxentius: his assumption of the purple had been confirmed by a recognised Augustus, his father Maximian,<sup>27</sup> and he could therefore make a plausible claim to legitimacy and hope that his rivals would recognise him as a colleague, so in his early days he made vigorous efforts to conciliate them.<sup>28</sup> For a short period, Constantine, whose legal and practical position was not much stronger than Maxentius', reciprocated,<sup>29</sup> but as soon as his situation improved he withdrew that recognition. L. Domitius Alexander, who in his turn rebelled against Maxentius and for about two years was self-proclaimed emperor in North Africa, also tried to win recognition from Constantine, but with total lack of success.<sup>30</sup>

Normally a failed rebel was doomed to die; very occasionally, as a mark of special clemency, he-or she-might be allowed to live, but only after public humiliation, to ensure that they could not again win support. Thus Aurelian spared the lives both of the two Tetrici who had been *Augustus* and *Caesar* in Gaul, and of Zenobia, ex-queen of Palmyra, but only after they had been led in his triumphal procession through Rome.<sup>31</sup>

So by the time of Constantine's rivalry with Licinius there is the tradition was four hundred years old, that a civil war had to be fought to the finish. No exceptions were known; there were no precedents for an indecisive contest ended by formal recognition on both sides of the other's right to exist. This, however, is exactly what happened at the end of the first war between Constantine and Licinius: whatever its exact date, the reasons for fighting, the vicissitudes of the fighting and the terms of the peace, one thing is beyond dispute, that after the war ended, just as before it began, Constantine and Licinius each formally and officially recognised the other as a legitimate emperor, and Augustus *optimo iure* (if I may be allowed a phrase which is of course never attested for emperors), and each publicised the other's name and titles in his territories alongside his own.<sup>32</sup>

No one could have foreseen this outcome when the war broke out; the difficulties which it caused in official circles are illustrated by the eloquent silence of the panegyrist Nazarius,

<sup>25</sup>N. Shiel, *The Episode of Carausius and Allectus* (Oxford, 1977) esp. 1-21; 32-34; 202-206.

<sup>26</sup>Cf. Vaballathus' coinage in Egypt for Aurelian, J. G. Milne, *Catalogue of Alexandrian Coins* (Oxford, 1971) 4303-4348; A. Geissen and W. Weiser, *Katalog alexandrinischer Münzen der Sammlung des Instituts für Altertumskunde der Universität zu Köln* 4 (Opladen 1983) 3053-3063. Also Carausius' famous Antoninianus showing, obverse, the busts of three Augusti with the legend, CARAVSIVS ET FRATRES SVI, and reverse, PAX AVGGG; on AVGGG, besides Shiel 191, see C. T. H. R. Ehrhardt, "Roman coin types and the Roman public," *Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte* 34 (1984) 44.

<sup>27</sup>Lactantius, *De Mortibus persecutorum* 26.3 and 7, with the commentaries of J. Moreau (Paris, 1954) and J. L. Creed (Oxford, 1984).

<sup>28</sup>C. H. V. Sutherland, *The Roman Imperial Coinage*, VI (London, 1967) 338-345; Grunewald, *op. cit.*, (n. 75), 23-25, 40.

<sup>29</sup>Sutherland 41, 217 no. 772c with 215 n. 2. Grunewald, 39-40, suggests that this was due to Maximian's influence soon after his arrival in Gaul in 307.

<sup>30</sup>Grunewald 43-44, and his inscriptions nos. 197 and 374 (= *CIL* VIII 22183; *AE* 1979, 303), with discussion, 237.

<sup>31</sup>Eutropius IX.13; Aurelius Victor 35.5; Zonaras XI.27.10; *SHA Triginta Tyranni* 24.4-5; 25; 30.24-27; *Aurelian* 32.4-34.3. Drinkwater, *op. cit.*, (n. 22), 43, 90-91, 183, 186-7 (the Tetrici); *Kleiner Pauly* loc. cit. (n. 23) (Zenobia).

<sup>32</sup>Grunewald, *op. cit.*, (n. 6), 115-121.

## MONUMENTAL EVIDENCE

called on to celebrate the *quinquennalia* of Constantine's two eldest sons, the Caesars Crispus and Constantine Junior, in 321.<sup>33</sup> His most recent extant predecessor, the anonymous panegyrist of 313, had had the grateful task of celebrating Constantine's victory over Maxentius in 312, the liberation of Rome from tyranny, the valour, insight and divine inspiration of his emperor.<sup>34</sup> Since then, Constantine had liberated the whole Balkan peninsula, and had restored the eternal light<sup>35</sup> to the imperial residences of Sirmium, Thessalonica and Serdica (Constantine said "My Rome is Serdica"),<sup>36</sup> and to Athens itself, the very home of civilisation. Moreover, the elevation of the Caesars themselves—which one might assume was an obligatory theme for any panegyrist on the occasion of their *quinquennalia*—was either the direct consequence or at least closely associated with the outcome of this war. Surely eloquence and ingenuity could turn these promising materials into a satisfying laudation of the martial prowess of the Augustus and his promising sons in their most recent war.

Not at all. Not only is there no mention of Licinius in Nazarius' panegyric, nor of his son, elevated to the rank of Caesar simultaneously with Constantine's two eldest son; there is also no hint of the latest civil war. Instead, the orator took refuge with an aged but at least safe subject: he once again put the armies of 312 through their paces, added a new miracle,<sup>37</sup> and in general tried his best to warm up again some very cold cabbage. It simply was not possible for official publicity to handle a drawn war.<sup>38</sup>

When hostilities began, no one expected the war to end as it did; everyone was convinced that there would be a decisive result and that one of the rivals would be overthrown. The vital problem was to know which one, and to ensure that one was on his side when hostilities ended.<sup>39</sup> For the great mass of the population, however, the answer was given by their rulers: for Constantine's subjects, Licinius was doomed to fail; Licinius' subjects were equally convinced of Constantine's inevitable end. In neither territory, therefore, could anyone openly do anything to praise or support the hostile ruler.

<sup>33</sup>Panegyric 10 Galletier = 4 Mynors.

<sup>34</sup>Galletier 9 = Mynors 12. Gr̃newald, *op. cit.*, (n. 6), 64-66; 72-73; 83-84.

<sup>35</sup>Sutherland, *op. cit.*, (n. 27), 143, 167 no. 34, with the legend REDDITOR LVCIS AETERNAE, the gold medallion celebrating the liberation of Britain, and of London in particular, by Constantine's father Constantius I, from the tyranny of Allectus in 296. For the finding of this medallion, and the others associated with it, see P. Bastien and C. Metzger, *Le trésor de Beaurains (dit d'Arras)* (Wetteren, 1977) 9-21.

<sup>36</sup>Anonymus post Dionem 15, in C. Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* IV (Paris, 1851) 199.

<sup>37</sup>Panegyric 10 Galletier = Mynors, 14-15, ghostly Gallic armies are led by Constantius I to aid his son.

<sup>38</sup>Thus it is not surprising that Eusebius, with the benefit of hindsight, preferred to allow the two wars to coalesce—(*Historia Ecclesiastica* X.8.2-8; 9.1-6; *vita Constantini* I.49-50; II.3-16)—with the main emphasis on events in the glorious, victorious second war. Andreotti, *Dizionario Epigrafico* IV 1, 1002.

<sup>39</sup>Cf. the account given by Di Maio and others *art. cit.* (n. 7), 81, of the plight of the mintworkers in Thessalonica, trying desperately to "hedge their bets" as they continued producing the money necessary to support the fighting that raged around them. Also Gr̃newald, *op. cit.*, (n. 7), inscription no. 334, where the engravers prudently left a vacant space for Licinius' name, obviously on the eve of the first civil war.

### III. *The Monumental but Overlooked Evidence*

According to the Anonymous Valesianus (5.15), the war was triggered off by the overthrow of the statues of Constantine in Emona, the modern Ljubljana, the border town on the confines of Italy, just inside Licinius' territory.<sup>40</sup> We can safely assume, even without an explicit statement in the surviving sources, that the statues of Licinius were thereupon overthrown in Constantine's territory, and it is quite certain that his name was erased from inscriptions.<sup>41</sup> The first steps towards destroying not only the tyrant but his memory too had thus been taken. In the midst of this iconoclasm, it would have been impossible for workers to continue sculpting portraits of Licinius to be placed on a huge public monument, erected in Constantine's honour, in the centre of Rome.

Every visitor to Rome has seen the Arch of Constantine. It is one of the few Roman monuments whose construction can be precisely dated within a very short span of time, from first conception to final completion. It could not even be thought of before Constantine defeated Maxentius at the Milvian Bridge on 28th October 312;<sup>42</sup> it was completed in time for the celebration of his decennalia on 25th July 315, for which it was no doubt the centre-piece.<sup>43</sup> There were therefore just over two and a half years for designing the Arch, planning its scheme of decoration, with its ornamental and symbolic characteristics, erecting the structure, and attaching the sculptured panels; it is a good example of the speed of construction under Constantine's rule, which produced impressive buildings in minimal time, as for example at Trier,<sup>44</sup> and as Zosimus disapprovingly remarks, at Constantinople, where a whole imperial city was constructed

<sup>40</sup>For the geographic and political position of Emona, see König, *op. cit.*, (n. 7), 118. As König, 123, points out, the ensuing hostilities took place around Cibalae, modern Vinkovci, 289 Roman miles (i.e. about 450km) east-south-east of Emona, which strongly suggests that Licinius did not have many troops close to his western frontier. Could it be that the Emona incident was engineered by Constantine, to bring on a war for which at the time he was better prepared than Licinius? Modern analogies exist. Allegedly Maxentius had already provoked war with Constantine by overthrowing his images and erasing his name from inscriptions (Paneg. 10 Galletier = 4 Mynors 12, 2-4). 'When had these images been erected? Cf. Moreau's and Creed's commentaries on Lactantius, *De Mortibus Persecutorum* 43.

<sup>41</sup>Grünwald, *op. cit.*, (n. 7), 101, discussing his inscription no. 138 (= *CIL* VIII 210), in which Licinius' name was erased, obviously at the outbreak of hostilities, only to be restored when peace was made (the erasure therefore was not a consequence of the second war, in 324).

<sup>42</sup>Lactantius, *De Mortibus Persecutorum* 44.4, with Moreau's and Creed's commentaries. Bruun's attempt, "The battle of the Milvian Bridge: the date reconsidered," *Hermes* 88 (1960) 361-370, has rightly found no adherents. The immediate response by M. R. Alföldi and D. Kienast, "Zu Bruuns Datierung der Schlacht an der Milvischen Brücke," *Jahrbuch für Numismatik und Geldgeschichte* 11 (1961) 33-41, was decisive.

<sup>43</sup>L. Richardson's attempt, "The date and program of the Arch of Constantine," *Archeologia Classica* 27 (1975) 72-78, to date the Arch to the celebration of the Vicennalia in Rome, 25th July 326 is a curiosity, useful only as a warning of what can happen when attempts are made to write history in complete ignorance of numismatics.

<sup>44</sup>Cf. H. Cüppers (ed.), *Trier, Kaiserresidenz und Bischofssitz*, 2nd ed. (Mainz, 1984); 23 (H. Heinen); 72-3 (H. Cüppers).

## MONUMENTAL EVIDENCE

within six years.<sup>45</sup> In this respect, as in others, there was less difference between Constantine and his tetrarchic predecessors than his eulogists liked to pretend.<sup>46</sup>

As is well known, much of the decoration of the Arch of Constantine consists of panels from earlier works, re-used and adapted for their new purpose.<sup>47</sup> There is no doubt that these Hadrianic and Antonine panels which are re-used on the Arch were specially selected for the positions which they occupy; on them Licinius originally appeared eight times, each time in strict parallelism with Constantine.<sup>48</sup> This parallelism emphasised the *concordia* between the two emperors,<sup>49</sup> and their equality of status.<sup>50</sup> What is more, on the reliefs in which Licinius' portrait has survived the ravages of time and of restorers,<sup>51</sup> his head is an integral part of the stonework, not an insert, so that it is not possible to argue that it could have been removed when war broke out and replaced when peace was made (cf. n. 41, above). In any case, after the *Bellum Cibalense*, Licinius was very much the inferior emperor, in Constantine's dominions at least:<sup>52</sup> the emphasis which the Arch's decorative scheme lays on the equality of the two Augusti would simply be impossible after Licinius' defeat.

Obviously the structure of the Arch had to be in place before the sculptured panels could be attached: these would be among the last finishing touches, set in place and given their final polish just before the formal unveiling on 25th July 315. Their design, however, must have been determined soon after the senate decided to erect the Arch, presumably in November 312, and the work of adapting the panels for their new position, and in particular of re-cutting the portraits to make them represent Constantine and Licinius, will have been carried out simultaneously with the building of the Arch.

Therefore, in October 314, the senators who had approved the design of the Arch and the theme of its decoration, the designers who had prepared the plans and were supervising the work, and the sculptors and stone masons who were at work with chisels, files and abrasives, all knew that they were setting up a monument to be as eternal as Constantine's dynasty-whose primary purpose was to glorify Constantine, but which also gave a prominent and honourable

<sup>45</sup>Zosimus, ed. Paschoud (Paris, 1971) II, 32, 1, with Paschoud's note, 229-230. If in fact Constantine had at first intended to establish his new capital at Troy, and had begun building there, Zosimus II.30.1 (see however, Paschoud's note, 224-6), then there was even less time for the construction of Constantinople, before its inauguration on 11th May 330. See G. Dagron, *Naissance d'une capitale: Constantinople et ses institutions de 330 à 451* (Paris, 1974) 19-42.

<sup>46</sup>Lactantius, *De Mortibus Persecutorum*, 7.8-9.

<sup>47</sup>H. P. L'Orange and A. von Gerkan, *Der spätantike Bildschmuck des Konstantinsbogens* (Berlin, 1939). In general on the use of spolia see B. Brenk, "Spolia from Constantine to Charlemagne: Aesthetics versus ideology," in *Dumbarton Oaks Papers* 41 (1987) 103-109, esp., for Constantine, 104-105.

<sup>48</sup>L'Orange and von Gerkan, 138, 141, 163-9, 184-7, with plates 41b, 42b, 45a-d, 46a-d, 47a-d. The surviving sculptures are also well illustrated in A. Giuliano, *Arco di Costantino* (Milan, 1955) plates 13, 15, 17-24.

<sup>49</sup>L'Orange and von Gerkan, p. 142.

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.* 170-1.

<sup>51</sup>*Ibid.*, plates 41b, 45a-b, 42b, 45c-d; see p. 184 and n. 2 for Pietro Bracci's "restoration" in 1773 of the imperial portraits in the Antonine panels, plates 46 a-d, 47a-d, which makes it impossible to know which panels showed which emperor.

<sup>52</sup>Grünwald, *op. cit.*, (n. 7), 114-118, 119-21.



## CHRISTOPHER EHRHARDT

place to his co-emperor Licinius, and stressed the concord and equality between the two.<sup>53</sup> To suppose that all these men calmly continued their work, intent only on completing their commission within the established timetable, after they got news that Licinius' men had overthrown their own emperor's statues, is obviously absurd. The reliefs on the Arch of Constantine stand as massive and irrefutable proof that there were no hostilities, nor expected hostilities, between Constantine and Licinius in the period from 29th October 312 to 25th July 315. Since the *Bel-lum Cibalense* could not have taken place in 314, there is no good reason to doubt Bruun's *new* chronology, that it broke out in 316 and was settled by the end of that year, or very early in 317.

Christopher Ehrhardt

*University of Otago  
Dunedin, New Zealand*

<sup>53</sup>I owe this insight, and first stimulus for this paper, to a lecture by Prof. J. Engemann, F. J. Dölger-Institut, Bonn, in 1979, to whom I now express very belated thanks. He should not be supposed necessarily to agree with the views expressed here, nor be held responsible for my errors.