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The Roman Eastern *Limes* from Constantine to Justinian — Perspectives and Problems

This paper is in the nature of a sally into the field of Late Roman/Early Byzantine studies, a field relatively unfamiliar to the student of the centuries of the declining Roman Republic and the Principate; but the effort should be made to break down the artificial frontier we tend to construct between the earlier and later periods of Roman imperial history. That the "plodding Roman legionary"[1] of the earlier centuries of Roman expansion had a different role to perform in the armies of Justinian's time is one implication of Procopius' argument in the Preface to his *Persian War*. He saw himself living in a new heroic age. The archers of his day, he would have us believe, were better men than those depicted by Homer, the sneaking, creeping marksmen of the fighting around the walls of Troy. The archers who were his contemporaries fought on horseback and were armed to the teeth; they were as well equipped and trained as the Persians, their arrows less rapidly discharged, no doubt, but more lethal than the enemy's.[1a] Procopius ignores them in his Preface, but the more lightly armed *infantry* of his day, a good proportion of them archers, hardly had a tactical role in the battles, primarily cavalry engagements, fought by Belisarius against the Persians.

The Roman mounted archers, a familiar sight for Procopius at Belisarius' headquarters, had long since acquired the fighting skills and equipment which had once made the Parthians a byword in the West. Procopius' distorted echo of the old Thucydidean τοπος of the greatness of his historical theme is of interest, not merely for the way he narrows his argument down to the question of fighting effectiveness and the development of new military inventions (επιτεχνησεις), but also for his assumption that fighting morale varies directly with military *expertise*. Not altogether valid, that assumption. The citizens of Antioch fought like heroes when Chosroes stormed their city, whilst the garrison of professional soldiers slunk away to safety.[2] A story from Cedrenus' chronicle of a later century may illustrate that point, too. The Saracen Emir of Tarsus sent a force to raid Byzantine Cappadocia. When it reached one village the local priest interrupted the service of the Eucharist, seized the bell-clapper (a stout 14ft. piece of timber, which would be dangling ready in the *narthex*) and in his priest's robes proceeded to smite and slay and rout the Saracens. When his bishop excommunicated him, he joined the Saracens, abjured Christianity and carried out frightful raids in Cappadocia and "all over Anatolia".[3] Religious enthusiasm could intensify fighting morale and also depress it.

This paper will consist mainly of a series of skirmishings along different lines of approach to the central problem of the Eastern *limes* from the fourth to the sixth century A.D. The varying amount of attention given to these different

lines of approach will not necessarily reflect their relative intrinsic importance or interest.

First, then, the men themselves, the soldiers who had to defend the Eastern frontier and fight its battles, their effectiveness as fighting men, the development of their fighting equipment and skills, and, since Procopius will have it so, their morale. Also, the fighting capacity and morale of the local civilian populations and of the enemy.

Much has been written about the decline in fighting efficiency of the Roman army in the Late Roman Empire. How far was this the result of progressive barbarisation of the army, officers included?[4] It would be easy to exaggerate both the decline and the degree of barbarisation. The Romans and Byzantines surpassed their adversaries in military skill,[5] but they had much to learn from their barbarian allies and enemies, as also from the Persians; on this subject Procopius has a great deal to tell us. We learn, to take a trivial instance, that the Persians even used sandbags to patch the walls of Petra in the Lazic War[6], or, again, that the Sabir Huns invented an improved and lighter form of battering ram and new methods of protecting it, a fact which filled Procopius with wonder.[7] To others the inventiveness of the barbarians (βαρβαρικη επινοια) was a familiar fact.[8] Who so wily and resourceful as the nomad horsemen and hunter? The Ephthalites, no longer strictly nomads, it is true, could engulf a whole Persian army in an elaborate animal trap[9] and Alans could use the lasso in military encounters,[10] Parthians their coralling tactics[11] with deadly effect. Vegetius knew that Alans, no less than Goths and Huns, had helped the Romans to improve their cavalry equipment.[12] Should we believe Herodian's story[13] that the Parthians first learned the arts of close combat and arms manufacture from refugees from the army of Pescennius Niger? A few refinements, perhaps. In the matter of siegecraft, in which the Parthians were notoriously ineffective, the frontiers were open, the *expertise* available since Assyrian times. The Sassanid armies had the skills, and more important, the financial resources and organisation, to make siege warfare sometimes worth waging, as well as captive Roman officers and engineers to learn from.

In general Procopius believed that the Empire had all the necessary skills, and also good soldiers, recruited from every fighting race within it and on its fringes. Blame their failures, and Belisarius' failures, on an oppressive bureaucracy and a corrupt and vicious court. The garrison of Beroea/Aleppo might not have deserted to Chosroes in 540 if they had not felt cheated of long arrears of pay.[14] Earlier Vegetius[15] had been aware of a deterioration in standards of military training, a decline arrested already, he implies, by his imperial master. The anonymous author of the 4th century tract *de reb. bellicis* was more concerned with shortages of manpower and finance. The mechanical inventions he recommended were not very convincing, but his main suggestions for reform — to save manpower by mechanisation and save government expenditure by getting the rich *possessores* to pay for frontier fortifications, and to settle more veterans, at an earlier age, on the land they had to defend, were sensible enough, if hardly practicable at the time.

The abundant literary material for the period we are considering (Ammianus, Joshua the Stylite, Malalas, Agathias, Theophanes and other writers of every kind) can throw much light on social conditions in the cities of the frontier zone, and on the impact on the local populations of their environment in this region of the overlap of two great military empires, of the interpenetration of older and more recent eastern and western cultures, religions, and forms of economic

organisation. Bradford Welles' study of the population of 3rd century Roman Dura[16] showed what could be done with exclusively epigraphic evidence. Could other cities in the subsequent centuries, e.g. Edessa, receive similar treatment? Some new evidence is slowly coming to light — in Edessa, for instance, the mosaics with their enchanting family portraits and Syriac inscriptions[17] — to supplement literary evidence, such as that of Joshua the Stylite. How far up and down the social scale is the reaction against Hellenism or against Greek religious orthodoxy relevant to the question of degrees of civic morale, or alienation, in these cities of the frontier zone? At what social levels and in what areas of economic activity was the pressure of imperial bureaucratic control and interference most intensely felt? The taking of initiative locally, the assumption of leadership in these frontier communities, what new incentives to replace the old, what new sources of wealth and influence were there to make this possible or desirable?

But such a study of men and society and of morale and alienation in the frontier zone presupposes an approach on a wider front, a survey of the relevant imperial institutions and their development. Here I can do little more than expand the chapter headings of the late A. H. M. Jones' *magnum opus* [18]. One would begin with the series of reforms and changes in the whole administrative structure of the empire, and especially of its armies, carried through by Diocletian and Constantine, recognising those rulers as, above all, thoroughgoing systematisers of a process of change and development already at work earlier in the 3rd century. One would exploit the material in the Codes and *Novellae* and find one's way through the complexities of the *Notitia Dignitatum . . . in partibus Orientis*. One would be concerned with the changes in the structure of the higher command, the gradual development of the system of ducates along the eastern frontier zone, the building up from old and new military units of the new mobile armies of strategic reserve alongside of the increasingly static *ripenses* and *limitanei*. One would have to estimate the effect of new methods and sources of recruitment of officers and rankers on the efficiency of the army, and the diminishing amount of manpower available by the end of the period for actual combat on the eastern frontier. Earlier, Diocletian, buttressed by his colleagues in the Tetrarchy, had expanded the army and consolidated frontier defences. It was mainly Constantine, fighting his way to sole rule over the whole empire, who created *ambulando* the new-style mobile armies of the 4th century. How far did he, in so doing, weaken the *limitanei* and the frontier defences? There is the general problem of the *limitanei*. They were certainly *treated* as second class troops. Garrison soldiers are always only part-time soldiers; but the evidence of the Codes makes it difficult to believe that already in the 4th century there were settled soldier/farmers all around the frontiers. What imperial constitutions, such as those of 423 and 443, refer to as an institution rooted in an earlier age, is something different from the cultivation of heritable, inalienable plots of land by serving soldiers tied to the soil.[19] Van Berchem's contention, based partly on a passage in Malalas[20], that Diocletian installed soldier/farmers in and around *castella* all along the eastern *limes*, should be rejected.[21]

What was most stimulating in van Berchem's monograph on Diocletian's army and the Constantinian reform was his attempt to combine the evidence of the *Notitia* with more recently discovered archaeological evidence, especially in the Syrian and Palestinian sectors of the eastern *limes*. And this brings me to a third line of approach, the archaeological, the study of the extant material remains of the *limes* system, the elucidation of the changes and developments in

the pattern of organised installations along the whole frontier zone from the Black Sea to the Red Sea. We are confronted with the remarkable fact that this frontier, although there were phases of limited advance and recession, although it was on occasions punctured and severely dented, remained where it was with very little alteration for 600 years, for 500 of which it had the form of a military *limes* with linked military installations. No wonder if, like Honigmann[22], we get the impression, from the accounts of wars and peace treaties in our period, that Romans and Persians alike tended to hold fast to their organised, fortified frontier line, reverting to it after making notable temporary advances into enemy territory. One reason for this lasting stability of the frontier, I shall suggest later, lay in the Romans' realistic grasp, from the very beginning, of the geopolitical factors involved.

Meanwhile, the *limes* itself and its material remains. Never any attempt to construct a continuous barrier, like Hadrian's Wall. The suggestion of the *auctor de reb. bell.*,[23] of giving the whole frontier a solid wall, with mile-castles, naturally fell on deaf ears. Hadrian's Wall was a more flexible instrument of control and defence than it appears at first glance. The Eastern *limes* was very much more so. It had grown out of the invisible frontier of the Early Principate, that thick padding of buffer states from the Caucasian protectorates and Armenia through the client kingdoms and principalities of eastern Asia Minor and northern Syria to the Nabataean Arabian kingdom at the southern end. A military *limes* was constructed step by step with a 40-year-long process of absorption of the inner line of buffer states (from A.D. 65 to 106), with forts and legionary garrisons linked by a new road system— from the north, along the upper Euphrates to Sura beyond its elbow, and thence down through Palmyra to Akaba, to screen Syria and Palestine. There were extensions in the form of a chain of small garrisons, forts and fortifications to the North along the Black Sea coast as far as the Caucasus,[24] and to the South as far as the Hejaz, to protect the final stages of the incense route from the Hadramaut and Yemen.[25] The auxiliary posts and the legionary camps in Asia Minor at Samosata, Melitene and Satala were linked both to the posts of the Syrian *limes* and back, direct across the Anatolian plateau, to Byzantium and the Danubian garrisons.[26]

I shall only mention the major changes in the line made in the following centuries: — the Severan advance to cover Osrhoene and Upper Mesopotamia (the line from Circesium along the River Khabur and the Jebel Sinjar, through Singara) consolidated and carried further by Diocletian, the final withdrawal from Nisibis and the Singara line after Jovian's treaty of 363 (with the loss of most of the districts across the Tigris ceded earlier to Diocletian) and the later advance of the line to cover Roman Armenia after the partition of Armenia in the time of Theodosius I. The incorporation of this final section of the *limes* and the creation of new ducates to cover this region were fully carried through only with Justinian's integration into the provincial system of the Roman Armenian satrapies and the *gentiles* of Sophene. From this moment the Cappadocian *limes* proper ceased to be a front line and the ducates west of the Upper Euphrates were abolished. The definitive line of the northern sectors is thus the line from the Euphrates up the R. Khabur, thence northwards, west of Nisibis, along the R. Nymphios and east of Martyropolis and Theodosiopolis (Erzurum) to the Black Sea. The Tzani tribes inland beyond Trebizond were pacified in Justinian's reign and the link with the coast and with Roman Lazica strengthened.[27]

There is much for the field archaeologist to do along the *limes* zone in

following up van Berchem's interesting but sketchy analysis of the topographical evidence embodied in the *Notitia Dignitatum* and in testing his theory that it reflects the great work of consolidation carried through by Diocletian (in parts supplemented by Theodosius I, as the mention of auxiliary units bearing his name suggests). The *limitanei*, he argued, were the *alae* and *cohortes* strung along the *limes* proper, along the Upper Euphrates in a rigorously linear disposition with very little backing of legions and first class *Equites*, and, beyond that, in a chain of similar *castella* to secure control over the strategic route that gave access to the regions of Roman influence in Caucasia. In the south there was in earlier centuries an outer network of roads, forts and watch towers beyond the line consolidated by Diocletian, the *Strata Diocletiana*, but later (perhaps some time after Theodosius I) this outer zone of the *limes* (το εξωτερον λιμιτον) seems to have been left to Arab phylarchs to patrol and protect, the Roman castella being restricted to the inner zone of the *limes* (το εσωτερον λιμιτον).[28] The rival Arab chiefs of the 6th century, al-Harîth and al-Mundhir, are found disputing possession of the region of steppe pastures south of Palmyra, al-Harîth claiming that its name, *Strata*, was sufficient proof that it was Roman territory.[29] One cannot safely identify this region called *Strata* with the strip of land traversed by the *Strata Diocletiana*. Since Justinian restored the fortifications of Palmyra, installed a garrison there and made it the headquarters of a *dux*,[30] we should expect him to have restored also the *castella* to the south along the εσωτερον λιμιτον, although Procopius says nothing of this.

After this brief description of the material *limes*, a word or two about the two factors which most affected its physical appearance and disposition. I am thinking, first, of the great change that came about through the collapse of the Parthian Empire early in the 3rd century and its replacement by the more vigorous, aggressive and more strongly centralised Sassanid Persian Empire. It is not merely a question of the greater military power and dynamism of the Sassanids. There is a shift in the direction of the main line of pressure westwards, as well as an intensification of the pressure on all sectors of the frontier. The Parthians were north-Iranians, preoccupied above all with maintaining their northern line of communications from Upper Mesopotamia to their homeland and the steppes beyond the Caspian and Aral Seas. Ctesiphon was the point on this line, where it bent back northeastwards towards Media and northern Iran.[31] The Parthians never had a secure grip on Lower Babylonia. Their writ did not run in the semi-desert steppe country along and south of the middle and lower Euphrates.[32] The rise and prosperity of Palmyra and Hatra are symptomatic of this weakness of the Parthians. Their most successful assertion of power westwards was not through Upper Mesopotamia, but through Atropatene (Azerbaijan) towards Armenia — a thrust easily held along the western edge of Armenia by the mountain barrier and river line of the Upper Euphrates and the corresponding stretch of the *limes*. The Sassanians, on the other hand, lost little time in securing Mesene at the head of the Persian Gulf and in eliminating Hatra, which, for a brief moment in the 3rd century had been a Roman ally, screened by a line of forts;[33] the effect of this is seen in Sassanid assertion of control over the nomad Arab tribes fringing Mesopotamia. Hîra, south of Babylon became a centre for their Arab satellites, sheiks of tribes which were eventually given greater cohesion under the strong hand of the Lakhmid al-Mundhir III. More important, the Sassanids' main thrust became a thrust in the direction of Roman Upper Mesopotamia and Osrhoene — they pushed the Roman frontier back west of Singara and Nisibis after the failure of Julian's offensive and later, too, probed deep into

Euphratesia and Syria.

Meanwhile, on the northern fringe, they were strong enough to assert themselves in Armenia and Caucasia and establish an effective counterweight to the Roman asset in those regions, the early conversion to Christianity of the local populations. The Iranian feudal aristocracy found more favour there, with the local aristocracies, at least, than the highhanded agents of the Byzantine bureaucracy. Social and political divisions and dissensions in Armenia also contributed to the definitive solution of partition into Persian and Roman spheres of control, a solution favourable to Persia, disastrous for Armenia itself.

The geographical factor I shall say more about later — the mountain barrier of the Anatolian Antitaurus in the north, which allowed only one or two lines of penetration to skirt or cross the valley of the Upper Euphrates and limited the number of defence installations needed to prevent invasion; in the southern sectors, the open steppe — after the fall of Palmyra a standing invitation to self-assertion by completely or partially independent Arab sheiks or princes. Here the *limes* had been laid down along the forward slope of a succession of ranges at the outermost limit of possible large-scale water conservation.[34] Designed simply to cut across and control by means of forts and watch towers the lines of seasonal transhumation of the Bedouin, it proved less and less adequate to restrict the freedom of movement of those mobile and predatory tribes. The central Mesopotamian and Syrian sectors, on the other hand, could be organised into a zone of effective resistance and defence, but they were always penetrable, demanding defence in increased depth and the fortification of cities as centres of resistance and refuge. The operation of these factors has had the effect of limiting the scope of and giving definition to the tasks of the archaeologist at work in the eastern frontier regions. Little material evidence to hand as yet along the thinner line of the Upper Euphrates or in the area of maximum reciprocal penetration in the semi-independent regions of Armenia and Caucasia, only partially or temporarily involved in the actual *limes* network; an abundance and great variety of material remains in the major regions of defence in depth and Sassanid pressure, in Upper Mesopotamia, Osrhoene, Euphratensis and Syria — city fortifications, *castella*, fortified settlements, works of water conservation and so on. Very different from the picture of the highlands further North, where Persian and Roman subjects farmed and traded peacefully side by side in normal times, until Justinian's new fortifications put an end to this peaceful scene. Here, of course, as on the Cappadocian *limes*, the inaccessibility of the mountain terrain has retarded investigation. It was not until 1968 that the first excavation of an auxiliary fort on the Upper Euphrates was undertaken — by Richard Harper for the British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara, at Pagnik Oreni (perhaps Dascusa of the *Notitia* and the itineraries).[35]

Let me give one or two examples of what is available for the archaeologist and what has been discovered further South along the *limes*. Note first, with Schlumberger, Dussaud and others, the effect of the fall of Palmyra on the process of Arab settlement and sedentarisation that had been going on in northern Palmyrene as well as in the steppe to the East — the evidence for a shift of population in the 4th century to regions further West, in northern Syria.[36] For the whole Syrian region the air and ground surveys of Poidebard, in particular,[37] present us with a wonderfully elaborate but confusingly palimpsest map of installations and lines of communication on the fringe of the steppe and penetrating some way into it. But precise attributions and chronological pinpointing can only follow from ground excavation. Similarly, in the Palestinian sector, the

doctors differ in their diagnosis. Thus where one scholar saw a string of Roman *limes* constructions, others assigned one site after another to earlier Nabataeans or to later Arabs.[38] Meanwhile in the Mesopotamian sector the archaeological reconnaissance carried out over a decade by David Oates[39] produced interesting results. Apart from his study of the interaction of nomad and sedentary peoples and the "pattern of resilience" in the local populations throughout the history of that region there was his survey of the fortifications of Singara itself — its walls and plan, like those inferred for Amida from Ammianus' narrative, apparently a mid 4th century anticipation on a smaller scale of the later fortifications erected for the land defence of Constantinople. The experience of warfare in Mesopotamia also went to reinforce traditional Roman conceptions of town-planning — for instance, the integration of city walls into the city plan as a whole. Contrast Antioch's outdated wall of Hellenistic type, an easy prey for Chosroes in 540, with what Anastasius and Justinian achieved at Dara and elsewhere, and Justinian's reduction of the walled area of Antioch itself, Hierapolis and other cities.[40] Dara, with its mighty double walls and bastions and vast water reservoirs like great underground cathedrals, has never been even surveyed adequately.[41]

The plan of action for the archaeologist in this region was laid down by Wheeler at the 1949 Congress on Roman Frontier Studies. Procopius' comprehensive review of Justinian's building work in the East (*de Aed.* II and III) gives us a firm archaeological datum line. One must work back from Justinian to Diocletian, compiling a set of archaeological criteria for dating buildings and construction methods, and so eventually substantiate, or find a more scientific and systematic substitute for, van Berchem's inspired guesses. But Procopius perhaps gives Justinian more credit than he deserves. For Osrhoene there is useful evidence, in the Chronicle of Joshua the Stylite, of the importance of the work of restoration initiated by Anastasius. The 140-year-long period of equilibrium on the eastern frontier, during which Persian kings fought it out with the Ephthalites on the Oxus and with Mazdokite heretics inside Persia, and the western Roman empire foundered, had ended suddenly, to reveal the *limes* installations everywhere in a state of dilapidation. More than one bishop, if we are to believe the ecclesiastical chronicler, set to work building and rebuilding in anticipation of financial compensation from Anastasius.[42] However the *de Aedificiis* is more than a mere list of fortresses. There is much of value for the archaeologist concerning the techniques and defence plans of Justinian's architects and engineers and the overall strategy of imperial defence. Old words appear with a new flavour of technicality and suggest new concepts of static or of tactical and strategical defence, προτειχισμα and κλεισουρα, for instance[43] (κλεισουρα from the Latin *clausura*). Contrast the open Eastern horizon, the natural frontiers Tacitus had in mind when, at the moment just before Hadrian made the decisive change to "a more or less static frontier" in the West,[44] he wrote of "*claustra* olim Romani imperii, quod nunc Rubrum ad mare *patescit*".[45]

Finally, Oates' survey of Qasr Serij[46] in the desert 40 miles northwest of Mosul will remind us that the archaeological line of approach cannot be used in isolation from the study of the diplomatic background to the problems of defence and warfare on the Eastern frontier. In the construction of this church of St. Sergius, a smaller version of the great *martyrium* at Sergiopolis (Resapha), Oates saw the hand of Chosroes I, creating a centre of loyalty for Christian (heretic) Arabs, tribesmen for whose adhesion Byzantine Emperor and Persian King were trying to outbid each other with promises of religious toleration.

Here is a fourth line of approach, the study of imperial diplomacy on the Eastern frontier, diplomacy as an instrument of imperial defence, supplementing and reaching far beyond the defence installations, preparing the ground for, reinforcing, and redeeming the failures of every plan of military aggression or advance. The antithesis and dichotomy of *vis* and *consilium* has as little meaning for the student of the later centuries as it has for the student of the operations of Augustus and Tiberius.[47] This is an interesting field of investigation, in which the Byzantinist, dealing with the history of the 10th and later centuries, is completely at home, and much has been written to make clear the continuity of Roman and Byzantine diplomacy.

I shall briefly mention one or two of the more important traditional instruments of Roman and Byzantine diplomacy. First, the practice of creating or designating client kings, princes and phylarchs or investing them with appropriately graded titles and insignia. Nero's investiture of the Armenian king Tiridates in Rome[48] was not merely a model to be imitated repeatedly in the later centuries. The whole system of investiture and graded titles gradually became regularised and elaborated until it achieved the state of institutionalised complexity mirrored in the *De Cerimoniis* of Constantine Porphyrogenitus. One can recall John Malalas' colourful account of the investiture of Tzath I as King of Lazica by Justin in 522[49] and Agathias' similar account of the despatch to Lazica of King Tzath II by Justinian in 555,[50] or reflect on the significance of Justinian's belated elevation of the Arab phylarch al-Harîth — a counter to the Persian recognition of the more formidable al-Mundhir III.[50a] Tzath I, baptised or rebaptised in Constantinople, could carry off a lady of the Byzantine aristocracy as his wife, al-Harîth preen himself with additional titles of rank, *patricius* and *illustrissimus*.[51] The would-be phylarch, Amorkesos, received from Leo invidious honours in Constantinople. Malchus remarks with asperity that, if he was to be a loyal and useful phylarch on the frontier, he should never have been allowed even to visit the capital.[52] But the policy was in general a sound one.

Secondly, the system of subventing allies, *foederati*, whole peoples and tribes and their leaders on the fringe of the empire. There were diplomatic exchanges of gifts or unilateral gifts at one end of the scale, regular subventions, tribute or blackmail at the other; money was used instead of men to keep off or buy the support of the raider or to appease the large-scale invader. Most important, the regular subsidies paid to the Persian king to cover the cost of guarding the passes through the Caucasus against the Alans or Sabir Huns to the North. Successive emperors, Leo, Anastasius, Justin refused to make the annual payments on various pretexts.[53] Procopius blames Justinian for paying such tribute when Chosroes spent the money, not on keeping off the Sabir Huns, but on bribing them to invade Roman territory.[54] Again, the general policy was sound, and traditional since Augustus. Justinian's plenipotentiary in the negotiations of 561/2 was careful to draw a distinction between paying regular subsidies to Saracen protégés of Chosroes and making an occasional courtesy gift.[55] On the other hand, the Saracen *foederati* of Rome received regular subsidies in cash and kind, granted in the hope that they would raid enemy territory rather than Roman.[56]

Thirdly, the despatch of Christian missions for political as well as religious ends and the important part played by bishops and other churchmen and monks in diplomatic activity of every kind. For instance, Justinian's mission to convert and conciliate the Caucasian Abasgi,[57] or his similar despatch of a bishop, ostensibly to minister to the Christians among the Tetraxite Goths of the Crimea.

The bishop carried out his secret political task with circumspection, says Procopius.[58]

As far as relations with Persia were concerned, this use of Christian dignitaries was a two-edged weapon. The Christian (Nestorian) Church in the Persian Empire was highly organised, normally enjoyed official recognition and was to a considerable degree under state control. Chosroes in the great raid of 540 made extensive use of bishops, who visited him as envoys and negotiators, to work his will in the Syrian cities and disseminate his propaganda.

The doubtful handicap to the Persian empire of the existence within its boundaries of large religious minorities was more than compensated by the fact that the populations of Byzantine Syria, and especially Egypt, became largely monophysite and more and more completely alienated from the orthodox government of Constantinople. On the other hand, the Caucasian buffer states and Armenia had their different intervals of adhesion to monophysitism, it is true, but their perseverance in the Christian faith was never in doubt, and was a factor taken full account of in Byzantine diplomacy. The Persian kings, after unsuccessful attempts to impose Zoroastrianism by force, were obliged to fall back on professions of toleration, and were content to repress Christian proselytising. The Georgian narrative of the Passion of St. Eustace, which surely derives from a sound 6th century tradition, illustrates this and other features of Persian rule and Persian religious toleration in Iberia most vividly. On the other hand, it was official persecution of monophysites in Syria that led to the arrival, in the first half of the 6th century, of the Syrian Fathers in Iberia, where they introduced Syrian monasticism and completed the conversion of Eastern Iberia.

Imperial religious policy was not always rigid and inflexible. Christian missions, monophysite as well as orthodox, could carry with them to barbarian tribes civilising influences which strongly favoured Byzantine political interests in such regions. Monophysite missionaries could be given diplomatic and economic support, as we learn most clearly from Zacharias' account of the mission of seven priests under a Albanian bishop to the land of the Sabir Huns beyond the Caucasus and the support they received from the imperial emissary Probus and from Justin. They deserved that support. They had been active in converting Huns and translating books into the Hunnic tongue. They were followed up by the Armenian bishop, who, in turn, built a church and taught the Sabir Huns the arts of agriculture and arboriculture.[59] At the opposite end of the Eastern frontier we find the same flexible policy at work. A Greek inscription of A.D. 559 from a ruined Monophysite monastic building southwest of Palmyra praises the phylarch, al-Harîth, Flav. Arethas, patrician of the Romans and *illustrissimus*, the protector and part builder of this monastery in his territory, and appears to repeat verbatim the acclamations with which he had been greeted by the demes of the capital at the time of his investiture by Justinian.[60]

"Missionary activity was the new element which gives Byzantine policy its distinctive quality".[61] I need not stress the ubiquity and the far reaching peregrinations of Christian priests and monks of both empires in this period.[62] There was that diminutive fifth column of monks (presumably Nestorian), who smuggled out the silkworm eggs for Justinian in A.D. 552, all the way from "Serinda", that is, Transoxiana/Sogdiana.[63] Within a generation the Byzantines had secured relief from the financial pressure of the Sassanid monopoly of the silk trade and Justinian's successor was able to concentrate his thoughts on the political and military, rather than the economic, advantages to be gained from an alliance with the distant ruler of Central Asia.[64] The Turk Dilzibul, from his

centre of power in the Altai, controlled the silk industry of the Sogdians, but, more important, he had shown that he could be more than a mere thorn in the flesh of the Sassanids. Menander's account[65] of the mission of the imperial emissary Zemarchus to the court of Dilzibul beyond the Oxus and the Aral Sea in 568/9 is only one item of the rich documentation he supplies for the working of Byzantine diplomacy in the 6th century. His account of the final mission to Dilzibul's son is even more revealing.[66]

The men, and behind them, the administrative institutions; the fortifications and, outranging them, the diplomatic activity — four different approaches to the study of the Eastern frontier and its defences. And now finally, the overall strategic conceptions that lay behind the creation and maintenance of the Eastern *limes*, the geopolitical factors and the extent to which they were understood and taken into account by the successive rulers of Rome and Byzantium.

The "Alexander dream", of the conquest of the Achaemenid heritage from the West, which had haunted Roman conquerers on occasion since the time of Pompey, faded away with the assassination of Caracalla; to say that it was denied any further lease of life by the simultaneous emergence of the Sassanids is perhaps not quite correct. The dream may have haunted the ageing Constantine; it became a fleeting reality for Heraclius. But for centuries it lapsed, and when, with Anastasius, the eastern half of the Roman Empire escaped from the menace of barbarian predominance, a new and different dream, the dream of recovering the full extent of Rome's Mediterranean empire, seized the imagination of the youthful Justinian. Realistic Roman emperors since the time of Augustus had allowed courtly flattery to blur the distinction between *orbis Romanus* and *orbis terrarum*. The Christianisation of the Empire gave no less scope for indulgence in this piece of wishful thinking. It became a pious aspiration. But if we go right back to the time when Pompey first faced the task of making a comprehensive settlement of the Roman East, it is not the scanty traces of the survival of the Alexander dream that interest us, but the evidence of a thoroughly Roman, realistic grasp of the geopolitical factors relevant to such a settlement. This realism seems to me to be the main characteristic of the aims and actions of those Roman emperors who most concerned themselves with the Eastern frontier problem. *Vis imperii valet, inania transmittuntur.*[67] The exceptions are few and notorious. Caracalla, Julian and Justin II, for example. The firm line of the northern sectors of the military *limes* laid down by the Flavian and Antonine emperors reflects the soundness and realism of Pompey's appreciation of the whole situation. The three legions at Satala in Armenia Minor and at Melitene and Samosata on the Upper Euphrates blocked the three lines of access from the East to the upper course of that river and through the great barrier of the Anatolian Antitaurus: first, the approach from the North Armenian plateau across high passes from Erzurum to Trebizond and westwards into Pontus and Paphlagonia; secondly, the long valley of the Murad Su coming west from Central Armenia and the region of Lake Van to end in Sophene beside the age-old crossing into Cappadocia at Tomisa/Melitene; thirdly, the route that ran immediately south of the steep southern edge of the Armenian plateau, the wall of Armenian Antitaurus. It traversed the region of the later Martyropolis and Amida to reach the Euphrates at Samosata, the first feasible crossing below the gorges of the upper river. Below this began the wide, more accessible strip of Osrhoene and Upper Mesopotamia, only gradually approached from the West by the Roman forces of occupation as they gradually appropriated the military skills and know-how in logistics and diplomatic finesse of the peoples bordering on the steppe, and

only fully consolidated as provincial territory by Severus.

Pompey had seen the necessity of establishing a Roman protectorate over the Caucasian states, Colchis (the later Lazica), Iberia and Albania, if Rome was to secure access to client Armenia. There was the potential value of an outer mountain wall, the Caucasus, as a barrier against the nomads of the limitless plains to the northeast and the threat of invasion through the Dariel and Derbend passes. Pompey was aware of the earlier activities and plans of his formidable opponent, the great Mithridates, an Iranian, capable of organising against Rome all the half settled, half nomad, at that time mainly North Iranian peoples around the shores of the Black Sea. Like the 6th century Turk, son and successor of Dilzibul, Mithridates had known "where the Dnieper flows and the Danube and the Hebrus".[68]

Pompey's one error was in underestimating the potential power, the resilience and indigestibility of the Parthian Empire. His overall scheme was conceived in an aggressive spirit at a moment of Parthian weakness. Corresponding almost exactly to the later sites of legionary garrisons in the Anatolian sector were the springboards for a future advance eastwards that he secured when he established the separate client state of Armenia Minor (the region where later Satala lay), when he granted Sophene and the Melitene crossing to the client king of Cappadocia and a bridgehead opposite Samosata to the client king of Commagene. Further south he saw the need of Roman control of Osrhoene, where he installed his client Abgar and below that he envisaged for Syria an extended screen of protectorates from Emesa to Nabataean Arabia. The sound Augustan policy of a military *detente* and coexistence with Parthia allowed the early emperors to exploit their position of *prepotenza* in the East in less unprofitable ways than by direct assault on Parthia, to ensure, incidentally, a virtual Palmyrene monopoly of the trade route from Syria to the Persian Gulf; and Nero's general Corbulo took full account both of the nomad threat in the Caucasus passes[69] and of Rome's inability to deny Armenia to the Parthians. The Parthians absorbed Armenia and established an Arsacid dynasty in power there; it was to counter this Iranian pressure that a new military *limes* had to be constructed to form an adequate, necessary screen for eastern Anatolia, where Iranian influences had been preponderant. The long-term result of that decision was the elimination of Iranian influence, political, social and cultural, in Eastern Anatolia; not so much by sealing it off from the East, as by tying it up firmly with Byzantium and the west in a network of military roads. Thanks largely to that network, the subsequent near completion of two processes, the Hellenisation and the Christianisation of the main mass of Anatolia,[69a] Anatolia acquired, as it were, a continental solidity and cohesion. We may observe the soundness and continuity of Roman defensive strategy, based by Corbulo and the Flavians on Pompey's initial appreciation, along the Anatolian sector. The legions are still sitting at Satala and Melitene in the *Notitia Dignitatum* at the end of the 4th century.[70] No instance of deep penetration from the plateau of northern Armenia into Anatolia past Satala until A.D. 1400, when Timur came that way. Roman coins found so far at Dascusa(?), north of Melitene, range from Nero to Arcadius.[71] Melitene was still being fought over and changing hands a score of times in the 10th century. The Anatolian Antitaurus was as solid a barrier as the southern Taurus was to prove to be, that mountain wall that has barred Anatolia to the Semites throughout historic times.

Two main problems arise concerning the Mesopotamian sector of the new *limes*. Was there a rational basis for the Roman annexation of Upper Mesopotamia? One can supply several reasons that go some way to justify Severus and his successors and Pompey's anticipation of their strategy. It was a region of developed civic communities with a Hellenistic, as later a Christian, background. It was far from being all plain or semidesert steppe, like the level land of tells one meets as one walks down from hilly Edessa through Harran towards the Aleppo-Baghdad railway or that one descries from the towering citadel of Mardin, from the steep escarpment of Mt. Masius. Much of it was suited to the manoeuvring and tactical habits of the Roman army. Again, it cut off a dangerous enemy salient in the direction of northern Syria, and its annexation meant the appropriation of an important, economically viable further slice of the Fertile Crescent, the central section of "that Syriac-speaking strip that stretched . . . from Antioch to Ctesiphon".[72]

Second question, why the repeated thrusts far down into Babylonia by a succession of Roman commanders? Not the "Alexander dream" again, surely. Hardly a serious intention of acquiring permanently the last section of the Fertile Crescent. Military-minded emperors could seize the opportunity of an easy thrust down a river line, a line of least resistance, once the logistics of such an invasion became manageable, with Ctesiphon a rich prize at the end. But the past history of earlier successes in Mesopotamia against a distracted Parthia created a mirage that proved fatal to Julian. Jovian's treaty of 363 rendered impracticable any repetition of Julian's attempt. Control of Armenia and the districts along and across the Tigris had been a necessary presupposition or concomitant of such a thrust. The partition of Armenia, leaving Theodosius I and his successors only the western fifth, made it an impossibility. We are left with the fact of Roman control of Upper Mesopotamia, as Trajan and Marcus Aurelius, perhaps, certainly as Severus and Diocletian, envisaged it. The soundness of the work of consolidation carried out, above all, by Diocletian was one main cause of the century and a half of peace and equilibrium that ensued after the death of Theodosius, at a time when both Rome and Persia struggled desperately with barbarian invasions and internal difficulties.

It was not as desperate or as lasting a struggle for the Persian kings as it was for the Roman emperors. With the next phase in Byzantine/Persian relations, at the very beginning of the 6th century, we are back in a situation very similar to that of the mid 3rd and mid 4th centuries. King Kavad was able to make the first move and, as the aggressor, profit from the state of material dilapidation and depleted manpower of the Byzantine frontier zone and penetrate deep into Roman territories. Anastasius, preoccupied with the Isaurians, took several years to bring this offensive to a standstill. He did not stop there. Procopius and John the Lydian justifiably emphasise the importance of his fortification of Dara.[73] Thanks to Joshua the Stylite's narrative we can appreciate not merely the oppressive efficiency of his organisation of military supply and the recklessness of his "Gothic" soldiery, but also the realism of Anastasius' strategical thinking in the East. Soon, under Chosroes I, the Persian Empire was to reach the peak of its military strength. Kavad and Chosroes between them carried out an internal reorganisation of the Persian Empire on a scale comparable with that of Diocletian two centuries earlier in the Roman Empire.[74]

Justinian was conservative, cautious and realistic in his policy and strategy on the Eastern frontier. He *had* to be so, if he was to achieve any of his imperialistic aims and ambitions in the West. His strategy is the defensive counterpart of Constantine's last-minute plan for the subjugation of Persia as John the Lydian describes it.[75] That had been a plan for the envelopment of the Persian forces

by a surprise thrust from a base in Caucasia, accepting the impracticability of an advance through Mesopotamia — the plan that Julius Caesar first conceived[76] and Heraclius finally carried through. Justinian's main task in the East, carried out in stages, was to consolidate the defences of the central sectors of the main *limes* region from Armenia to Syria. When this was to all intents and purposes achieved, he could throw his full weight on to the northern wing of the frontier. Justin had taken the initiative in Caucasia, but it was a long time before his successor could switch adequate military forces in that direction. Iberia was beyond his grasp. The Persians controlled the inner lines of approach to it and made full use of their greater resources of manpower to carve roads along which even elephants could cross the wooded ranges, to exploit their control of the passes into Lazica, to conquer most of that country and make a bold bid to reach the Black Sea coast and threaten Byzantine control of the sea approaches. It was the stalemate in and increasing stabilisation of the central sectors of the *limes* that rendered the situation in Lazica ever more critical. Bury[77] noted the sudden build up of Roman forces in Lazica from about 12,000 in 531 to some 50,000 troops in 552, a startling figure when compared with the total of about 15,000 men Belisarius took to reconquer Africa or his earlier armies of 20 to 30,000 in the central sector. In Procopius[78] we surely have Belisarius' appreciation of the military situation and his calculation of what Chosroes had in mind, a thrust to the Black Sea and the possibility of outflanking the solid defence in depth of the central *limes*. Chosroes was strong enough to capture, and ultimately to deny to the Byzantines, the strong coastal fortress of Petra.[79] The Roman extra effort on the northern wing of the *limes* was justified. The Persians had eventually to give way in Lazica; the whole coastal region and most of inland Lazica reverted to Rome. As Wellington would have said, it had been "a damned nice thing" in Lazica, "the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life". I need not stress the commercial value for the Empire of Byzantine control of coastal Lazica.

But Justinian's resources were too severely strained to enable him to achieve any corresponding substantial gain on the southern wing of the *limes*. Something was done to bolster the Arab Ghassanids, but the rival Lakhmid leader, al-Mundhir III, was for decades (until 554) the scourge of the Roman Southeast[80] and Roman influence was not restored in the Red Sea area in spite of the diplomatic efforts of Justin and Justinian. In earlier centuries, Palmyrene merchant princes, backed by aggressive Roman diplomacy, had escorted their convoys through Parthian territory to the Persian Gulf and Roman bullion had been used as an effective instrument of diplomacy around the Arabian Gulf and in the Indian Ocean. It had "financed a great venture in the far South East, established and maintained foreign agencies and factories, created local currencies and built up Roman prestige overseas".[81] Cosmas Indicopleustes[82] records the success of a Roman merchant delegation in Ceylon in the reign of Justin I that seems to echo the experience of an Alexandrian Greek centuries earlier in the time of Claudius;[83] but his tale will not deceive anyone as to the real strength of the Persian position astride the land and sea routes in the 6th century. The emperor's Axumite allies could do little to remedy the situation.

Motives of economic imperialism were never determining factors on either side in the wars between East Rome and Persia. In the time of Justin II, who let the Turkish envoys get a glimpse of the now flourishing imperial silk industry in Syria, the Persians were still successfully asserting their claim to be the sole intermediaries in the silk trade between China and the West. One recalls the

extraordinary scene in A.D. 568, reported by Menander,[84] when Chosroes paid for the whole convoy of silk offered him by the Turkish envoys and burnt it under their noses. This may have been one of the things that led Dilzibul to make overtures for an alliance with the Byzantine emperor, but Chosroes' campaigns in the West had other motives besides the desire for monetary gain, although we can see from Procopius' narrative how strong that motive was. If Chosroes exploited to the full his position of economic and financial advantage, he was also and above all the heroic king, prepared to lead his army in the field, his actions often prompted by motives unfamiliar to members of the Byzantine court and bureaucracy. The new heroic age, for all Procopius' assertions and denials, was more of a reality on the Persian than on the Roman side of the frontier. The Persians were superior in man power, in effective military strength and in morale.

But if Justinian's imperialist ambitions in the west drained the strength of the Empire, if as a hero he cuts a sorry figure in comparison with Maurice and Heraclius, let alone with the resplendent Chosroes I, his reign left more durable monuments than any of theirs. We may also, perhaps, view him, in his successful military and diplomatic holding action on the eastern frontier, as the reluctant but not unworthy heir to the strategical thinking of the emperors, Roman and Byzantine, who preceded him and who, for all their universalist theorizing and propaganda, had recognised the claim of the Persian King to *Gleichberechtigkeit*[85] and the need for equilibrium in the East.

The defences of Byzantine Anatolia needed that extra buttressing, that strategical επιτειχισμα[86] on its northeastern wing, which Justinian had provided. In the heroic age of Heraclius and Chosroes II the eastern *limes* lost its earlier function; the Moslem invasions saw the end of it in its old form; but in the long view, it was the inviolability of Anatolia within its mountain walls of Taurus and Antitaurus, hellenised, Christian, orthodox Anatolia, that mattered most. Anatolia was to be the economic powerhouse and the powerhouse of manpower and morale for Byzantium for hundreds of years. Much was to depend on the mighty walls of the imperial city and on the fleet that would bind together its thinly strung coastal territories and markets; but Anatolia was to be its main reservoir of energy. The *limes* that had kept that reservoir intact for so long, and had made possible its later functioning, cannot be said to have failed in its main purpose.

In conclusion, we must see the whole problem of the eastern frontier within the wider perspective of history. That frontier from Black Sea to Red Sea should be seen as something secondary, tangential to a vaster, less defined frontier that runs from East to West, from the China Sea to the Atlantic, the frontier with part of which Owen Lattimore concerned himself in his study of the inner Asian frontiers of China,[87] in what he called the "continental" period in world history, the study of "the constant alternation of evolution and devolution of the structure of 'tribal' and 'barbarian' societies in contact with the high agricultural and urban societies to the south of them".

The Roman and Persian Empires were two great consolidated empires, mature societies, juxtaposed, their rulers in a position to understand the extent to which they complemented, excluded and limited each other. Their confrontation is something very different from the endless historical process I have just summarised in Lattimore's words. Instead, we see half a millenium of relative equilibrium, accompanied by a good measure of interaction and reciprocal erosion, it is true, but only belatedly coming to an end in a tragic climax of

mutual destruction at the beginning of the 7th century, an old-fashioned Theban Tragedy of the Two Brothers.

But for the causes of that final tragedy one would have to look not merely inside those two empires — for instance, at the working of such irritants as religious or economic rivalries or deeper causes that lay in the nature of ancient autocracies — but also outside them, at the pressures that built up all along Lattimore's East-West frontier line and at the way in which these contributed to the disturbance of the equilibrium of the East-Roman/Persian frontier. Lattimore's thesis of a "continental" phase of world history would need to be reformulated so as to take account of further areas of interaction between sedentary civilisations and unsettled peoples in the southeast and south, in the Arabian peninsula and along the northern fringe of the Saharan steppe. In the wider perspective the great mountain barrier of Antitaurus and Taurus appears as a high wall, but a wall precariously buttressed and blocking only one of the land bridges and corridors that indissolubly link together the destinies of Europe, Asia and Africa.

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NOTES

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For a convenient map see E. Stein, *Histoire du Bas Empire* II (1949), opposite p. 900-

(1) So described by Sir Mortimer Wheeler at the 1949 Congress on Roman Frontier Studies.

(1*a*) Procop. *BP* i.2; cf.i.18.31f.

(2) *ib.* ii 8 24-25.

(3) Georgii Cedreni *Hist. Comp.* II. 329-330 (Bonn).

(4) E. Stein, *Hist. Bas Emp.*2 I. 16ff.

(5) cf. in general E. A. Thompson, *Past & Present* no. 14 (1958) 1ff.

(6) *BP* II. 30. 18ff.

(7) *BG* IV. 11.27ff.

(8) Zosimus V. 21.2; Anon, *De reb. bell. Praefatio* § 4 (E. A. Thompson, *A Roman Reformer and Inventor*, p. 91).

(9) Procop. *BP* I. 4.

(10) Josephus, *BJ* VII. 250; cf. the Suda *s.v.* Σειραις

(11) e.g. Plut. *Vit. Crassi* xxv.

(12) Vegetius, *De re milit.* 1.20.

(13) III. 4.8ff.

(14) *BP* II. 7.37.

(15) *loc. cit.*

(16) C. B. Welles, "The Population of Roman Dura" in *Studies . . . presented to Alan Chester Johnson* (ed. P. R. Coleman-Norton).

(17) cf. *e.g.* J. B. Segal, *Anat. Stud.* III (1953) 117ff. and Pl. XII. 1. See now J. B. Segal: *Edessa. The Blessed City* (O.U.P. 1970).

(18) A. H. M. Jones, *The Later Roman Empire* (1964).

(19) *C.Th.* VII. 15.2 (423 AD); *C.Th.* II. Nov. XXIII § 4 (443 AD); Jones, *op. cit.* II.Ch. XVII, esp. pp. 649ff.

(20) *Chron.* XII. 308 (Bonn); D. van Berchem, *L'Armée de Dioclétien etc.*, pp. 3ff.

(21) cf. Jones, *l.c.*; W. Seston, *Historia* IV (1955) 284ff; A. Alt, *ZDPV* 71 (1955) 82ff.

(22) E. Honigmann, *Die Ostgrenze des byz. Reiches* 1ff.

(23) Ch. XX.

(24) Arrian, *Peripl. mar. Eux.* I-XI.

(25) cf. H. Seyrig, *Syria* 22 (1941) 218ff.; G. W. Bowersock, *JRS* LXI (1971) 228f.

(26) cf. esp. E. Gren, *Kleinasien und der Ostbalkan etc.* Ch. IV.

(27) Procop. *BP* I. 15. 19ff.; Agathias, *Hist.* V. 1ff.

(28) cf. Theophanes, *Chronogr.* 174.13; 175.15 (Bonn); Malalas xviii. 445 (Bonn).

(29) Procop. *BP* II. 1.1ff.

(30) *id. De Aed.* II. 11. 10-11.

(31) for this trunk route cf. Isidore of Charax, *Mans. Parth. ap.* Müller, *Geogr. Gr. Min.* I. 244ff.

(32) Parthian control of Mesene was intermittent at best; cf. Nodelman, *Berytus* XIII (1960) 83ff.

(33) cf. A. Maricq, *Syria* 34 (1957) 288ff.

(34) cf. A. Poidebard, *La Trace de Rome dans le désert de Syrie* (1934) I. 20ff.

(35) cf. *Anat. Stud.* XIX (1969) p. 4; 21st Annual Report of the Brit. Inst. Ankara (1969) 8-9; R. P. Harper, *Pagnik Oreni Excavations*, 1969 (METU Keban Project Publications, Series 1, No. 2).

(36) cf. D. Schlumberger, La Palmyrène du Nord-Ouest, esp. pp. 131-2; H. Dussaud, *La Pénétration des Arabes en Syrie avant l'Islam*, Ch. IV, esp. pp. 91ff.

(37) cf. Poidebard, *op. cit.*; P. Mouterde, A. Poidebard, *Le Limes de Chalkis* (1945).

(38) cf. A. Alt., *ZDPV* 71 (1955) 82ff.; G. W. Bowersock, *loc. cit.* 219f.

(39) *Studies in the Ancient History of Northern Iraq* (1968).

(40) Procop. *De Aed.* II. 9-10.

(41) cf. V. Chapot, *La frontière de l'Euphrate*, p. 313ff. (ignoring Note 1, p. 314).

(42) *Le Chronique de Josué le Stylite* (transl. M. Martin (1876), § 88 (Edessa); § 93 (Birtha).

(43) Procop. *De Aed.* III. 3.2; III. 7.5.

(44) H. Schönberger, *JRS* LIX (1969) 167.

(45) Tac. *Ann.* II. 61 (of Elephantine and Syene).

(46) D. Oates, *op. cit.* 106 ff.

(47) cf. D. Timpe, *Der Triumph des Germanicus* 60ff. for the earlier period.

(48) Cass. Dio (ed. Boissevain) LXIII. 1ff.

(49) Malal. 412-413 (Bonn).

(50) Agathias, *Hist.* III. 15.

(50*a*) Procop. *BP* I. 17. 47.

(51) cf. A. Alt. *ZDPV* 67 (1945) 260ff.

(52) Malchus *ap.* Müller, *FHG* IV. p. 112f. (frgt. 1).

(53) Joshua the Stylite § 22 (Zeno and Anastasius); Zacharias of Mitylene VIII. 5 (Justin).

(54) *BG* IV. 17.9-10.

(55) Menander Protector, frgt. 11 *ap.* Müller, *FHG* IV. p. 211.

(56) cf. Jones, *op. cit.* II. 611; III 182, note 8.

(57) Procop. *BG* IV. 3.18ff.

(58) *ibid.* IV. 4. 12ff.

(59) on this see A. A. Vasiliev, *Justin the First* 250ff.

(60) see note 51 *supra.*

(61) A. Gasquet, cited by Vasiliev, *loc. cit.*

(62) cf. P. Brown *JRS* 59 (1969) 93f.

(63) Procop. *BG* IV. 17; Theoph. Byz. *ap.* Müller, *FHG* IV. pp. 270ff. For the correct identification of Serinda see R. Hennig, *Terrae Incognitae* II. 56ff., 71ff.

(64) cf. E. Stein, *op. cit.* II 773.

(65) Menander, *Exc. de leg. ap.* Muller, *FHG* IV. 247ff. (frgts. 19-22).

(66) *ibid.* p. 246 (frgt. 43).

(67) Tac. *Ann.* 15. 31.

(68) cf. note 66 *supra.*

(69) cf. his annexation of Pontus Polemoniacus in 65 AD and, for the Flavians, heirs to his policy, McCrum & Woodhead, *Select Docts. . . Flavian Emperors* nos. 275, 369.

(69*a*) For evidence that these processes were never completed for all Anatolia *cf.* A. Bryer, *The Tourkokratia in the Pontus, Neohellenica* I (1970), 30ff.

(70) *Not. Dign. Or.* (ed. Seeck) xxxviii.

(71) see note 35 *supra.*

(72) P. Brown, *cit. sup.* p. 93.

(73) Procop. *BP* I. 10; Joh. Lydus, *De Mag.* III. 47.

(74) cf. B. Rubin, *Das Zeitalter Justinians* I. 291ff.

(75) *De Mag.* III. 34.

(76) Suet. *Vit. Div. Jul.* 44.

(77) J. B. Bury, *HLRE* (Dover ed.) II. 116, note 1.

(78) *BP* II. 16. 26ff. and esp. II. 28. 17-30.

(79) cf. Rubin, *op. cit.* 354 and note 1162.

(80) Procop. *BP* I. 17. 48.
(81) cf. J. I. Miller, *The Spice Trade of the Roman Empire*, Ch. XIII, and my review in *JRS* 60 (1970).
(82) *Christ. Topogr.* xi. 448c-d (p. 323 ed. E. O. Winstedt).
(83) Pliny, *NH* VI. 85.
(84) Menander, *Exc. de leg. ap.* Müller, *FHG* IV. p. 225ff (frgt. 18).
(85) cf. K-H. Ziegler, *Die Beziehungen zw. Rom. u. dem Partherreich*, Ch. vi.
(86) Procop. *BP* II. 16. 29.
(87) O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* (2nd ed. 1951).

Review and Discussion

The Archaeology of Roman Britain. By R. G. Collingwood and Ian Richmond. 9½ x 6¼. Pp.XXVI + 349 (including 109 figs.) + 26 pls. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1969. £4.20.

R. G. Collingwood's *The Archaeology of Roman Britain* first appeared in 1930. Wide in scope, simple in approach, and written with the authority of the unchallenged leader of Romano-British studies, its success was inevitable, and it remained the standard work for many years after Collingwood's death. Such success probably made the production of a revised edition inevitable, and no-one was better qualified for this task than Sir Ian Richmond. Unhappily he died before the work was finished and it was left to Mr. D. R. Wilson, his research assistant, to complete the work. Naturally, he has changed Richmond's text as little as possible, but one is left with the suspicion that Richmond himself might have been more severe had he lived to make a final revision.

In this new edition Richmond, no doubt as requested by his publishers, has faithfully followed Collingwood's original pattern, a decision which is largely responsible for the major limitation of the book — the fact that it attempts to cover too wide a field for the space available. The first quarter of the book is concerned with military topics, including roads which form the subject of the opening chapter. The second chapter covers marching camps and semi-permanent camps, which were occupied for more than a few nights but which held only tents. A minor inconsistency is the reference to Cawthorn Camp D as semi-permanent in the text (p. 14) but as a practice-fort on Plate IIIa. Chapter III, on Fortresses and Forts, attempts to cover in 42 pages a vast range of material, and, upon the whole, it does it very well. Little of Collingwood's original remains, for the work of the last forty years has produced a very great deal of new material, and Richmond's task in cramming this into the restricted space available must have been a daunting one. Inevitably he has little room for qualifications or doubts, with the result that a number of questionable points emerge as certainties. Some of these, admittedly, have arisen since Richmond's death, but the majority were known before the book went to the press in 1968. The foundation of Lincoln, for example, is firmly dated to c. A.D. 47 (p. 16), although most archaeologists now prefer a date in the mid-fifties, including Sheppard Frere in *Britannia* published in 1967. Both Chester and York are stated to have been destroyed in the historical events connected with the defeat of Allectus in 296, and York in 197, after C. Albinus' bid for the empire, as well; associations which are not accepted by most workers today. Another surprise is Richmond's attribution of the famous cavalry parade helmets from Newstead to the first Flavian fort, whereas they certainly form part of the general mass of equipment buried on the destruction of the second Flavian fort in A.D. 100. A peculiar division, which continues from the first edition, is the discussion of the forts of Hadrian's Wall and the Antonine Wall in this chapter and of the remainder of those defence systems in a separate chapter on "Frontier Works";